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Five Decades of Family Law*
SANFORD N. KATZ**
I. Introduction
On May 15, 2008, the Supreme Court of California issued its opinion in
In re Marriage Cases' in which that court held that the state law restrict-
ing marriage to a man and a woman was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the California Constitution. Thus, California became the second
state in the United States to permit same-sex marriages to be performed in
its state. Five years earlier, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health2 declared its state's marriage
law unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution, making
Massachusetts the first American state to allow same-sex marriage.
Who would have thought fifty years ago when the Section of Family
Law of the American Bar Association was established that the institution
of marriage, which Justice Field in the 1888 United States Supreme Court
case of Maynard v. Hill3 described as "creating the most important relation
in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people
than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the leg-
islature," 4 would be redefined not by a state legislature, but by an American
state supreme court? Goodridge made history, and deservedly so. In addi-
tion to its holding becoming an issue in the 2004 presidential election,
there was the additional question in that presidential campaign of whether
* ©2008 Sanford N. Katz.
** Darald and Juliet Libby Millennium Professor of Law, Boston College Law School;
Chair, Section of Family Law, American Bar Association, 1980-81; Editor in Chief, Family
Law Quarterly, 1970-81; recipient of the American Bar Association Section of Family Law
Distinguished Service Award.
1. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). While this article was in press, on November 4, 2008, the
people of California voted to amend the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage.
2. 709 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
3. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
4. Id. at 205.
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such a fundamental change in the social institution of marriage should be
a matter for the courts to determine or for the people through the actions of
the legislatures or through their own actions in the ballot box.
The opinion in Goodridge was praised by those who regarded the chal-
lenge to the limitation of marriage to a man and a woman as an infringe-
ment of a civil right. It was attacked and defiled by those who saw the
redefinition of marriage as an affront to morality and religion and the
actions of Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, the author of the opinion and
those who joined her, as "activist judges" who had not followed "the law"
but had "created" it. Often overlooked by those who attack the substance
of Chief Justice Marshall's decision is her constant reference to "civil
marriage" in her opinion. In so doing, she seemed to be respectful of those
who regard marriage as something more than a civil status and the mar-
riage ceremony as more than a civil act.
The twenty-first century thus opened with the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts making the most revolutionary family law decision in
the history of America, followed by the Supreme Court of California five
years later. Perhaps some might say that the redefinition of marriage from
its being a union of one man and one woman to its being a union of two
adult persons was inevitable because during the last half of the past cen-
tury, gender roles and hierarchy in marriage have been lessened or eradi-
cated and a new and more egalitarian model of marriage has taken the
place of the traditional one.5 That Massachusetts should have been the
state where a test case challenging the conventional definition of marriage
would be brought was not unusual because the highest court in
Massachusetts has a history of interpreting its constitution more broadly
than the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal constitution
insofar as the protection of individual rights is concerned. In addition, that
court has not rigidly adhered to conventional definitions of family rela-
tionships 6 and perhaps more importantly has been mindful of changes in
5. Elsewhere I have written before Goodridge was decided:
The theme that seems to describe contemporary laws regulating the marriage relationship is the emphasis
on individual rights, the right of each partner to a marriage to define her or his role within certain legal
boundaries. In the past when marriage was considered a union of a man and a woman in which the couple
became "one," the reality was that the husband dominated the relationship at the expense of his wife.
The modern concept of marriage as a special kind of partnership has given rise to the idea that marriage
as partnership means marriage as a contract between two individuals who maintain their individuality,
psychologically, socially, and legally.
SANFORD N. KATz, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 75 (2003).
6. For example, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), Justice Ruth Abrams,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, recognized the status
of "de facto" parent in a same-sex couple's custody case. She wrote:
A child may be a member of a nontraditional family in which he is parented by a legal parent and a de facto
parent. A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the child's
life as a member of the child's family. The de facto parent resides with the child, and, with the consent and
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social mores.7
Whether the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was ahead of
where society is on the question of same-sex marriage or whether it mere-
ly reflected changing attitudes in the new century remains to be seen.
8
From 1958 to 2008, there have been substantial changes in family law, all
recorded in the pages of this Quarterly, in which the U.S. Supreme Court,
state supreme courts, state legislatures and the federal congress have all
played a role.
II. The Fifties and Sixties
At the close of the 1950s and in the decade of the 1960s, America saw
the beginnings of the great civil rights movement that brought changes in
American life and in American law. The movement raised the conscious-
ness of the courts and legislatures on individual rights and laid the ground-
work for reforms that were to occur in the 1970s, especially with regard
to the rights of individuals in the family and their relationship to the State.
In addition, it was in the 1950s and the 1960s that the great divorce reform
occurred. New York, for example, abolished adultery as the sole ground
for divorce during that period, bringing that state in line with the rest of
the country.9 In the 1950s, Judge Paul W. Alexander sought to humanize
the divorce process in Toledo, Ohio, and his court became a prototype for
family law courts that stressed an informal setting and the introduction of
encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent.
Id. at 891.
7. For example, in Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998), the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld an expressed contract between two unmarried adults living
together. Justice Greany, writing for the court, held that "unmarried cohabitants may lawfully
contract concerning property, financial, and other matters relevant to their relationship." Id. at
146. He stated, "Social mores regarding cohabitation between unmarried parties have changed
dramatically in recent years and living arrangements that were once criticized are now relative-
ly common and accepted." Id. at 144. It is important to note, however, that Justice Greany
makes clear that there is still an important distinction between the legal rights of married cou-
ples imposed by law and those of cohabitants, who, for example, without an express contract
are not entitled to the equitable distribution of property upon the termination of the cohabita-
tion, and no right to court-ordered separate support or alimony. See id. at 146.
8. Following Goodridge, a number of state legislatures enacted statutes not only banning
same-sex marriages but stating that out-of-state same-sex marriages would not be recognized.
While this article was in press, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its opinion in Elizabeth
Kerrigan et al. v. Comm'n of Pub. Health et al. (SC 17716). The highest court in Connecticut
held that the state's statutory scheme, which regulated marriage and banned same-sex couples
from marrying, violated the equal protection provisions of the state constitution. In addition, on
November 4, 2008, Arizona, California, and Florida amended their state constitutions through
referendums banning same-sex marriage.
9. For a discussion of divorce reform in the 1960s, see generally Henry H. Foster, Jr.,
Current Trends in Divorce Law, I FAM. L.Q. 21 (1967). The article was published in the sec-
ond issue of this Quarterly.
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nonadversarial methods such as mediation and arbitration to help resolve
family conflicts."°
Substantive laws of divorce were the subject of material changes in the
late 1960s when California enacted its no-fault law. During the next
decade, state after state reviewed its divorce laws, in many instances with
the guidance of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, and within
decades, almost all the jurisdictions had adopted a no-fault divorce law
either as the only basis for divorce or in addition to fault grounds.'I With
the changes that occurred with grounds for divorce came inevitable
changes in defenses and procedure. Emphasis in no-fault divorce shifted
from proving grounds to determining questions pertaining to the assign-
ment of property with new theories about marital property 12 and the deter-
mination of child custody with expanded alternative arrangements.13 The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provided standards for consideration
of both of those incidents of divorce. 14
It was during the decade of the 1960s that the federal government, pri-
marily through the efforts of social welfare specialists on the staff of the
Children's Bureau of the then U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, became interested in the plight of abused and neglected chil-
dren.15 The Model Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Act, thought to be
radical at the time because it was alleged to have infringed on family
privacy, was proposed to the states. It fulfilled two purposes: (1) it raised
the issue of child abuse and neglect, not as a social issue for community
planners, but as a matter for legal intervention into the family by some
state agency and (2) provided a model act for the states to either adopt or
modify. With the interest of the federal government and the work of those
10. The Section of Family Law took an active role in setting standards for mediators in
divorce disputes. An issue of the Family Law Quarterly was devoted to articles on mediation.
See 17 FAM. L.Q. 451, 451-540 (1984).
11. See KATz, supra note 5, at 76-86. By 1978, only Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota retained the "fault only" grounds for divorce. Thirty-five states had irretrievable break-
down as a ground, of which seventeen had it as the sole ground and eighteen had it added to tra-
ditional fault grounds. Doris Jonas Freed and Henry H. Foster, Jr., reported these facts in their
annual survey. See Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States: An
Overview as of 1978, 13 FAM. L.Q. 105, 109 (1979).
12. In this regard, Professor Mary Ann Glendon's article, Modem Marriage Law and Its
Underlying Assumptions: The New Marriage and the New Property, 13 FAM. L.Q. 411 (1979),
had a profound impact. It was Professor Glendon who first wrote about the changing nature of
property in marriage and how one's job generates one's property, not one's family name. The
ideas of her article were later published in MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE
NEW PROPERTY (1981). I discussed Professor Glendon's theory in KATZ, supra note 5, at 91.
13. See generally David J. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345 (1979).
14. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 307-08 (Disposition of Property), § 402 (Best
Interest of the Child), in KATz, supra note 5, at 185-203.
15. See KArz, supra note 5, at 140-43.
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who had developed the Model Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Act,
child protection became a matter of public concern and a whole body of
child protection law was developed. ' 6 Child maltreatment became a major
concern of social workers, sociologists, pediatricians, child psychiatrists,
and psychologists who provided a great deal of rich literature on the
subject. 7
At the same time that child abuse and neglect were given attention by
lawmakers, another problem arose: what disposition should be made for
abused and neglected children who were unable to return to their homes
after court intervention? Foster care and adoption then became a central
issue for social workers, social planners, lawyers, and federal and state
legislators. 8 Out of that concern came federal model acts dealing with ter-
mination of parental rights and subsidized adoption.'
9
The area of law now described as domestic violence has its origins in
the child abuse laws. Once the protection of children in the home was rec-
ognized as trumping the privacy of the parent-child relationship, it was
not difficult to expand that protection to adult members of the family,
especially wives. Further is the matter of the child sexual abuse of chil-
dren by Roman Catholic priests that occurred in the 1970s. Those abuses
were not acknowledged at that time because of the taboo attached to dis-
cussing such events with anyone. Nor were they reported to the police or
any other public authority because of the protection priests received in
reporting laws. It took thirty years for that to change. Since 2008, because
of the child-sexual-abuse scandal, many Catholic priests are in prison2°
16. See generally SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO
FAMILY BREAKDOWN (1973); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected
Children, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975); JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA
(2006). Professor Myers's 2006 book is an excellent study of this era and his footnotes are a
rich source of references.
17. See generally ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE
STORM-BLACK CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE (1972); DAVID FINKELHOR,
SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN (1979); GEORGE GERBNER ET AL., CHILD ABUSE: AN AGENDA
FOR ACTION (1980); JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI & ROSINA M. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE
(1979); RAY E. HELFER & C. HENRY KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE
COMMUNITY (1976); RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE (1978).
18. For a discussion of the issues in adoption that were of concern in the 1960s, see gener-
ally Felix Infausto & Mildred A. Shanley, Annual Review of Decisions and Statutory Revisions
Affecting Adoptions-1965-66, 1 FAM. L.Q. 10 (1967); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption
Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-83, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173 (1983).
19. For a discussion of the Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement and the
Model Subsidized Adoption Act, see KATZ, supra note 5, at 143-44. The Act is reproduced in
Sanford N. Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 FAM. L.Q. 3, 11 (1976). For a discussion
of the development of the Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placements, see general-
ly Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Development of a Model Act to Free Children for Permanent
Placement: A Case Study in Law and Social Planning, 13 FAM. L.Q. 257 (1979).
20. Elsewhere I have written:
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and many Catholic archdioceses have been sued successfully. Several
have gone bankrupt. 21
Ill. The Seventies and Eighties
Before the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court decided relatively few cases
that had direct bearing on family law; the most notable, decided in the
1940s, were the Williams v. North Carolina22 cases concerning divorce
jurisdiction. In the 1960s and 1970s, that changed, I believe because of the
concern for the protection of individual rights of adults and of children,
both in terms of their relationship with the State and in court proceed-
ings.23 It was in the 1970s that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized and to
At the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new century, the vulnerability of children,
especially, but not exclusively, prepubescent boys, was brought to the attention of the American public by
the front page news reports of the sexual abuse of those children by Roman Catholic priests. Indeed, accord-
ing to a study commissioned by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, from late 1999 to 2002,
nearly 4,392 priests were reported to have sexually abused 10,000 children over approximately fifty years
by four per cent of diocesan priests in ministry during that time. Through 2006, the numbers have contin-
ued to increase so that the number of credible victim reports has exceeded 12,000, and nearly 5,000 priests
have been implicated.
The sexual abuse scandal in the Roman Catholic Church has led to thousands of legal claims, at least
hundreds of which remain unsettled as of 2006. Through April 2006, United States dioceses had spent over
$1.38 billion in settling sexual abuse claims, leading to concern that the Church will not be able to afford
the full economic consequences of the sexual abuse scandal. Many plaintiffs in Massachusetts, California,
Kentucky, and the Pacific Northwest, the areas hardest hit by the scandal, have already settled their claims
for staggering sums. Some claimants, concerned about the ability of local dioceses to compensate the abuse
victims have even attempted to seek damages directly from the Vatican.
Sanford N. Katz, Protecting Children Through State and Federal Laws, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 309, 310 (Bill Atkin ed., 2007).
21. In the article cited above, supra note 20, I have the following footnote references (form
revised for this article) to support my statements about legal claims against certain archdioceses:
5. Richard Willing, Church Battling Plans to Ease Abuse Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2006, at A2.
Some lawsuits have been held up as claimants battle judicially and legislatively to extend the statute of lim-
itations on abuse claims dating back to 1950. Others' claims have been extended as a number of
Archdioceses have declared for bankruptcy. Ashbel S. Green & Steve Woodward, Portland Settles Abuse
Suits, to Leave Bankruptcy, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 22, 2006, at 10; see also Constance F. Fain & Herbert
Fain, Sexual Abuse and the Church, 31 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REv. 209, 227 (2006).
6. The Archdiocese of Boston, Massachusetts settled with over 500 claimants for roughly $85 million
in September 2003. Stephanie Ebbert, Diocese Property Deals Net $90M; Unused Real Estate Being
Liquidated, BOSTON GLOnE, Nov. 6, 2005, at Al.
7. The Dioceses of Orange, Orange County, California settled with 87 claimants for $100 million, and
the Los Angeles Archdiocese in Los Angeles, California settled with 45 claimants for $60 million, though
hundreds of claimants remain. Jill Leovy & Jessica Garrison, Priests' Victims are Emboldened, L.A. TIMEs,
Dec. 4, 2006, at B I; Associated Press, Catholic Church's Costs Pass $1 Billion in Abuse Cases, N.Y. TiMEs,
June 12, 2005, at A33.
Katz, supra note 20, at 310-11.
22. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams 1); 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II), reh'g denied, 325
U.S. 895 (1945).
23. See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (abortion); Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) (sex discrimination in Alabama alimony statute); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
(civil commitment and juveniles); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (jurisdiction in
support); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (rights of
foster parents); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental consent in abor-
tion); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (limits on confinement in civil commit-
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a certain extent protected the rights of unwed fathers who had for so long
been shadow figures in the lives of their children and indeed invisible in
terms of the adoption of those children at least insofar as social service
and child welfare agencies were concerned.24
Also, the 1970s was a decade in which two state supreme courts
changed two long-standing legal doctrines that ultimately found affirma-
tion in other state supreme courts and in state legislatures. These doctrines
concerned the legal implications of cohabiting adults and the enforcement
of prenuptial agreements.
Marvin v. Marvin25 stands out as a high watermark in family law in the
1970s because of its recognition of the rights that may attach to two adults
who are living in a marriage-like relationship upon their termination of
that relationship. Before Marvin, lawyers who had as a client a person
who had been living in a nonmarital intimate relationship and had termi-
nated it, and who sought money damages, would have had to be artful in
terms of describing the facts of the case and try to fit their client's claim
for relief into an acceptable legal construct, often a fiction. That was a
difficult challenge because romantic friendship is not legally recognized
and there is abhorrence to providing a legal or equitable remedy for non-
marital relationships with sexual overtones. In addition, courts tended to
think in terms of dichotomies: either one was married or not. With the
decline in the recognition of common-law marriage, the former was not
available for argument.
Even though Michelle Marvin ultimately received nothing,26 the fol-
lowing principle was established: legal consequences may result when
ments); McNeil v. Dir., 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (contempt and self-incrimination in civil commit-
ment proceedings); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (rights of parents regarding their
refusal on religious grounds to send their children to school under a state compulsory school
attendance law); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (burden of proof in juvenile proceedings);
In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (procedural fights of juveniles in court proceed-
ings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (due process in juvenile court proceedings);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (notice in adoption proceedings); Ford v. Ford, 371
U.S. 187 (1962) (full faith and credit and child custody); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705
(1962) (insanity defense in civil commitment proceedings).
24. See generally Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (adoption rights of unwed
fathers); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (adoption and unwed fathers); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (support obligations for unwed fathers); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (rights of unwed fathers in termination of parental rights hearings). The famous case
in the 1980s was Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (notice to the unwed father in adop-
tion proceedings). Professor Jerome A. Barron was the first constitutional law scholar to recog-
nize the legal complications resulting from the U.S. Supreme Court case of Stanley, and his
seminal article was published in this journal. See generally Jerome A. Barron, Notice to the
Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM.
L.Q. 527 (1975).
25. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
26. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1981).
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two adults live together in a marriage-type relationship but without a for-
mal marriage ceremony and without conforming to common-law-marriage
requirements. The principle has been modified and clarified by other state
supreme courts and state legislatures through the years.27 Some have limit-
ed it by requiring agreements to be expressed, even in writing, while others
have been less restrictive.
Contract cohabitation has found acceptance by being the predicate for
registered-domestic-partnership legislation 28 and the basis for the
American Law Institute's proposal for domestic partnerships.29 Contract
cohabitation has been highly criticized in literature.3° A number of critics
view contract cohabitation as a poor substitute for marriage and, in com-
paring it to marriage, determine that it falls short in almost all aspects of
what makes marriage sound in terms of an individual's happiness, health,
fidelity and commitment, and the basis for family formation. After
reviewing the empirical data comparing cohabitation to marriage,
Professor Garrison concluded:
The first significant fact established by recent research is that cohabitation is
usually a short-lived state. Although the likelihood that cohabitation will lead
to marriage is declining, approximately 60 percent of all U.S. cohabitants and
70 percent of those in a first, premarital cohabitation marry within five years.
More tellingly, only about 10 percent of all U.S. cohabitants who do marry are
still together five years later. By contrast 80 percent of first marriages survive
five or more years and two-thirds survive for at least ten years. Cohabitation
thus represents, for most couples, a brief transitional stage on the way to either
marriage or separation.
Cohabitants tend to be younger and less prosperous than married couples.
More importantly, they do not typically follow the relational norm associated
with marriage. Cohabitants are much less likely than married couples to have
children together, to pool their resources, to feel secure and unconflicted in
their relationships, to value commitment, or to express commitment to their
partners. They are more likely than married couples to be in a physically abu-
27. See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DIsTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
§ 1.02 (2002) for a full discussion with references of the rights of unmarried cohabitants and the
various legal constructs available to cohabiting couples that are often imposed by courts after
there has been a termination of the relationship. See also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Property
Rights A rising from Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 69 A.L.R. 5th 219,
226-36 (2005), for an extraordinary compilation of material on cohabitation contracts as well
as a limited bibliography.
28. For a discussion of registered domestic partnerships, see KATZ, supra note 5, at 17-23.
29. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01-6.06 (2002) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES].
30. Professor Marsha Garrison has done extensive research and writing about contract
cohabitation and is critical of the American Law Institute's domestic partnership proposals. See
generally Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the ALI's Domestic
Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLuTIoN 305 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed.,
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sive relationship, and less likely to demonstrate sexual fidelity.
31
A major question is whether contract cohabitation should be the func-
tional equivalent of marriage. For the most part, that question has been
answered in the negative through case law, especially in states that have
either reluctantly recognized a cohabitation contract or imposed many
restrictions. For example, in a state that makes a meaningful distinction
between the legal status of legitimate and illegitimate children, children
born to a nonmarital cohabiting couple are illegitimate, requiring some
affirmative action by the birth father if he wishes to have any legal con-
trol over his child. Failing that, if the couple terminated their arrangement
and the birth father sought custody, a court would have to apply the con-
cept of de facto parent if it was available in the state to give the father any
rights. Unless there were specific provisions in a written agreement
regarding the financial consequences of the cohabitation or oral promises
that could be proven or implied were made during the cohabitation, most
courts have refused to apply the incidents of divorce, like equitable distri-
bution of property or alimony, upon the termination of a cohabitation
arrangement. 32 To do so would have the effect of reviving common-law
marriage, which has been abolished in most American jurisdictions.
In the same decade that the California Supreme Court broke with tra-
dition and sanctioned contract cohabitation, the Florida Supreme Court
decided Posner v. Posner,33 which upheld a prenuptial agreement. That
court recognized the change in social mores, especially that divorce was
an event that occurred with enough frequency that it should be the subject
of planning. The court was therefore willing to expand the enforcement of
a prenuptial agreement that went beyond the private ordering of wealth
upon death to allowing individuals to privately order the allocation of
their wealth upon divorce.
Before Posner, the position of most state courts was that any mention
2006). That article has a wealth of social science data comparing cohabitation with marriage.
Volume 76, No. 5, 2001 issue of the Notre Dame Law Review was dedicated to the topic of
unmarried partners and the legacy of Marvin.
3 1. Garrison, supra note 30, at 307-09 (footnotes omitted).
32. See Collins v. Guggenheim, 631 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. 1994), where Justice Nolan wrote,
"Cohabitation in Massachusetts does not create the relationship of husband and wife in the
absence of a formal solemnization.... We have not permitted the incidents of the marital rela-
tionship to attach to an arrangement of cohabitation without marriage." Id. at 1017 (citation
omitted). But see DeVanney v. L'Esperance, 949 A.2d 743 (N.J. 2008), where the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that cohabitation was not an indispensable element of a palimony
action.
33. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). The Oklahoma Supreme Court had upheld prenuptial agree-
ments more than twenty-five years earlier and continued to sanction it. See generally Hudson v.
Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); Clark v. Clark, 202 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1949); Talley v.
Harris, 182 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1947); Pence v. Cole, 205 P.172 (Okla. 1922).
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of divorce in a prenuptial agreement might have the effect of encouraging
a termination of the marriage and thus, the whole agreement might be held
unenforceable. Prenuptial agreements often are regulated by state statute,
which sets out requirements such as mandating (1) a writing to conform
to the Statute of Frauds; (2) a time frame in which the parties sign the doc-
ument before the wedding ceremony, minimizing the suggestion of undue
influence; (3) a disclosure of each party's finances; and (4) legal counsel
for both parties. 34 In addition to the question of whether the time of exe-
cuting the agreement or the time of divorce determines enforcement, the
other major question in prenuptial agreements is whether they are part of
the law of contracts and should be treated as any other contract, or
whether they are special contracts reflecting a certain public policy that
protects individuals from making bad bargains. The second question is
particularly relevant when considering the substantive terms, such as the
waiver of alimony or any property distribution. The hard-line approach is
to assume an arm's length transaction, in a sense disregarding the real
context, which is not commercial, and say that adults should be able to
privately order their own lives and give up alimony and property if they
are fully aware of the consequences of their actions. The other approach
is to take into account the context and ask whether it is in the public inter-
est to allow an adult to contract away her rights, which might mean that if
she waives all her economic rights at the time of entering into the agree-
ment for whatever reason and with all the statutory safeguards, she might
be left either destitute or nearly destitute upon divorce, which could be
years after the agreement was signed. 35 This is particularly serious given
that public welfare in the United States is now very limited in terms of
who qualifies for any welfare relief.
IV. The Eighties, Nineties, and the New Millennium
Twenty-five years ago, the Section of Family Law celebrated its silver
anniversary by dedicating its Summer 1983 Family Law Quarterly issue
to looking backward and forward. In the Introduction to the issue, I wrote:
Those twenty-five years have seen enormous changes-in American mores, in
the condition of women, in the attitudes toward children, fathers, toward the
law itself. Women are no longer merely modest, self-effacing sanctuaries for
their energetic spouses who daily attack the economic domain to earn provi-
sion for their homes, but equal partners in an ongoing relationship, which even
34. The American Law Institute has set thirty days before the wedding as the appropriate
time frame, stating that signing in less than thirty days raises the rebuttable presumption of
duress. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, § 7.04.
35. This issue and others pertaining to prenuptial agreements are discussed in KArZ, supra
note 5, at 30-34.
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if it terminates in divorce leaves them with rights unheard of twenty-five years
ago. Fault in divorce is almost a dead issue. Marriage itself is only one of the
choices for cohabitation, and recently even cohabitants of the same sex have
been claiming rights if the parties break up or if one of them dies. Marital
property has been redefined to include pensions, work benefits, professional
gains, and even reputation. Children are no longer only pawns between bat-
tling parents, but individuals whose needs and temperaments must be consid-
ered in custody cases. Illegitimate children are legally almost co-equal to the
offspring of marriage. 36
During the past quarter of the century, not only has progress been made
in terms of advancing the rights of women and children in a variety of
contexts, but also marriage has undergone major changes, both in terms of
the definition of marriage (already discussed) and individuals maintaining
their own legal identity in that relationship. Women no longer lose their
legal identity when they marry. The old fiction that marriage is "one" and
that one is the husband has been abolished. Laws have been enacted to
protect women from the brutality of their husbands. Contract cohabitation
now is a legally protected alternative relationship to marriage. There has
been a definite constitutionalization of family law as well as a recognition
that the international aspects of family law are playing more and more of
an important role in domestic law. The federal government has continued
its involvement in child welfare legislation, but there are signs that it will
expand into areas traditionally reserved to the states. It is too early to
determine the extent to which the American Law Institute's Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution will have on state legislatures and in court
opinions, but certainly there is a move toward uniformity in state laws
regulating the establishment, administration, and termination of family
relationships.
The institution of adoption has changed. The secrecy that defined the
adoptive relationship and the fictions that were associated with adoption,
often reflected in the matching process, have been replaced with new
practices by child welfare agencies who place children for adoption and
new state laws that reinforce the practice. There has been a recognition
that there are two domestic adoption processes, one involving children
whose legal bonds with their parents have been judicially terminated
because of neglect or abuse, and the other concerning the release of new-
borns and placing them with prospective adoptive couples. Each process
has its own legal issues and at least one of them, which concerns both
processes, is the role of race in attracting prospective adoptive families
and in the placement process.37
36. Sanford N. Katz, Introduction to the Anniversary Issue, 17 FAM. L.Q. 99, v (1983).
37. See KATZ, supra note 5, at 153-182. See generally Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial
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A new term, "open adoption," has entered the legal lexicon. It refers to
the practice of allowing a birth parent to have post-adoption visitation
rights. Such practice would have been unheard of twenty-five years ago
when the idea of adoption required a full termination of the rights of birth
parents in their children placed for adoption and the complete integration
of adoptive children into their adopted families. A second term, "open
records," which refers to allowing adopted children and birth parents to
gain access to their adoption records, has also become part of adoption
law in certain states.38
Adoption has been the traditional method of establishing a family when
married couples were unable to have their own children by natural means.
For years, artificial insemination was considered the only alternative.
Then came In re Baby M, 39 and the phenomenon of surrogate motherhood
was recognized, although in that case the surrogacy contract was invali-
dated. Science, through genetics and assisted reproductive technology,
has changed family formation. Questions arose such as whether assisted
reproduction should be regulated and, if so, by whom; who is an heir, and
when does one become an heir; who is a male, and who is a female; who
is a mother, and who is a father? These questions were thought to be
answered by traditional science, law, and custom, but are now being liti-
gated without uniformity. Traditional presumptions about family relation-
ships are being abandoned or at least questioned.
The titles of each chapter in Assisted Reproductive Technology by
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., and Maureen McBrien and published in 2006 by
the Section of Family Law of the American Bar Association reveal the
extent to which this incredible scientific advancement has an impact on
family law, decedents' estates, contracts, torts, and public policy: "(1) The
Modern Family and Reproductive Technology; (2) Intrauterine
Insemination; (3) In Vitro Fertilization; (4) Cryopreserved Embryos; (5)
Surrogacy; (6) Government Regulation of Assisted Reproductive
Technology; (7) Posthumous Reproduction; (8) Reproductive Cloning; (9)
Standards of Care: Law, Liability and Assisted Reproductive Technology;
(10) Assisted Reproduction Contracts and Documents." 40
Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudices and Discrimination Float under a New Halo, 6. B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 409 (1997); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Redefining the Transracial Adoption Controversy, 2
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131 (1995).
38. I have discussed "open adoptions" and "open records" in KATZ, supra note 5, at 167-70.
An excellent nonlegal study of secrecy in American adoption practice is E. WAYNE CARP,
FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION (1998).
39. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
40. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR., & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE (2006).
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In 1983, I concluded my introduction to the anniversary issue:
In our world, which would have been unrecognizable twenty-five years ago
when the Family Law Section began, family law is struggling valiantly to keep
pace with the sometimes stupendous changes wrought both by science and a
whole new psychological climate. Law schools and practicing attorneys have
their homework cut out for years. The Family Law Quarterly will, we hope,
continue to offer the latest, the most carefully studied, and the sharpest presen-
tation of our current problems and practices. 4
1
Many of the issues that were covered in the Silver Anniversary issue
are still with us today and discussed in this issue, twenty-five years later.
But there are new areas that have been added as family law itself has
expanded and new questions have been asked. The authors of the articles
in this special issue are all experts in their field and have had a major
impact on the area of their specialization.
In 1967, Father Robert F. Drinan, S.J., was both chairman of the
Section of Family Law and editor in chief of this journal. In his preface to
the first issue of this journal he wrote, "When the Section of Family Law
was established in 1958, the leaders of the American Bar Association
referred to the new Section as 'the conscience of the bar.' 42 Through the
years, the section has provided the American Bar Association with its
views and positions on family law issues that have had both a direct and
indirect impact on national public policy and the legal profession. At age
fifty, the Section can be proud of its record of leadership in advancing
family law reform and for fulfilling the aspiration of leaders of the
American Bar Association stated at its birth.
41. Katz, supra note 36, at x.
42. Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Chairman's Preface, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 (1967).
